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How To Compensate Physicians When Both Patient and Physician Effort Are Unobservable
Kenneth L. Leonard
Joshua Graff Zivin Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics
In this paper, we construct a joint production model of health with two-sided asymmetric information and ask the question, "Hwo should physicians be compensated?" We demonstrate theoretically that the preferred physician compensation scheme depends on the illness condition.
Keywords: INFORMATION; HEALTH SERVICES; PHYSICIANS; COMPENSATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 D80 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clu:wpaper:2000_02
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