How To Compensate Physicians When Both Patient and Physician Effort Are Unobservable

Kenneth L. Leonard () and Joshua Graff Zivin

Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a joint production model of health with two-sided asymmetric information and ask the question, "Hwo should physicians be compensated?" We demonstrate theoretically that the preferred physician compensation scheme depends on the illness condition.

Keywords: INFORMATION; HEALTH SERVICES; PHYSICIANS; COMPENSATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 D80 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clu:wpaper:2000_02

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