COOPERATIVE GAMES: CORE AND SHAPLEY VALUE

Roberto Serrano ()

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory.

Keywords: Game theory; cooperative game; characteristic function; solution concept; core; Shapley value; axiomatics; equivalence principle; non-cooperative implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2007_0709

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