ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM: PREFERENCE DIVERSITY IN A SINGLE-PROFILE WORLD

Roberto Serrano () and Allan M. Feldman ()
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Allan M. Feldman: CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

Keywords: Arrow's theorem; single-profile; preference diversity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07
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ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/wp/07/0710.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2007_0710

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