How to incentive Who? Intra-personal and inter-personal mechanisms

Vittorio Pelligra

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract:

The paper focuses on the working of incentives both in parametric and strategic situations. It challenges some of the basic assumptions of the traditional model of economic agent which is usually assumed as self-interested and consequentialist. Psychological researches have stressed the descriptive limitations of that model and pointed out the relevance of other behavioral principles. Intrinsic motivations, reciprocity and trust being the most prominent among them. The paper analyses two different kinds of incentive mechanisms, namely, intra-personal and inter-personal and presents the results of an experiment that emphasize the empirical relevance of the latter. Besides providing a more descriptively adequate picture of interactive agency, such mechanisms have important normative implications that are discussed in the closing section.

Keywords: Incentives; reciprocity; trust; crowding-out; institutional design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C91 D23 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2004
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://crenos.unica.it/crenos/files/wp/04-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200404

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ernesto Batteta ().