Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games

Vittorio Pelligra

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract:

Psychological Game Theory (PGT) extends classical game theory allowing for the formal analysis of belief-dependent sentiments and emotions such as resentment, pride, shame, gratefulness, and the like. PGT incorporates these factors by relating agents' subjective expected utility to players' strategies, to their beliefs about others' strategies, but also to their beliefs about others' beliefs about their strategies, and so on. This paper argues that, thanks to the epistemic consequences of this hierarchy of beliefs, PGT is well-endowed to address, and to some extent solve three of the most challenging problems recently emerged in classical game theory, namely, the problem of intentions, that of trust and that of decision frames.

Keywords: Psychological games; intentions; trust; decision frames. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C9 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-soc and nep-upt
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200702

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