Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games

Abigail Barr (), Chris Wallace, Jean Ensminger and Juan-Camilo Cardenas ()

DOCUMENTOS CEDE from UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE

Abstract: Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third- Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
Date: 2009-03-05

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http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2009-09.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Homo Aequalis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:005427

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