Export restraints and horizontal prooduct differentiation

Nicolas M.M. Boccard () and Xavier Yves Wauthy

No 1997082, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of hor- izontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna [89]. We show that a foreign pro- ducer would choose a Voluntary Export Restraint in the vicinity of the Free Trade Equilibrium. In order to maximise domestic welfare, a government would not necessarily choose complete protectionism nor free trade.

Keywords: Hotelling; optimal quota; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-10-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/att ... 5/coredp_1997_82.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Export Restraints and Horizontal Product Differentiation (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1997082

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Address: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Alain GILLIS ().