Social insurance and redistribution

Robin Boadway (), LEITE-MONTEIRO, Manuel, Maurice MARCHAND and Pierre PESTIEAU

No 2001041, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable particularly when there is a negative correlation between laborproductivity and loss probability.

Date: 2001-10-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp01/dp2001-41.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Insurance and Redistribution (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001041

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Address: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Alain GILLIS ().