Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

Francoise Forges, Enrico Minelli and Rajiv Vohra ()

No 2001043, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and the interim stage.The analysis includes issues of non emptiness of the core as wellas core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

Keywords: core; asymmetric information; incentive; compatibility; exchange economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey (2000)
Journal Article: Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001043

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