Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates

Rabah AMIR, Igor EVSTIGNEEV and John Wooders ()

No 2001050, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.

Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; endogenous spillovers; research joint ventures; R&D cartel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp01/dp2001-50.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001050

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Address: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Alain GILLIS ().