Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly

Rabah AMIR, Niels NANNERUP, Anna Stepanova and Elina EGUIAZAROVA

No 2001051, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D.

Keywords: oligopolistic R&D; spillover process; research joint ventures; R&D cartel. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-01
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Journal Article: Monopoly versus R&D-Integrated Duopoly (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001051

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