Coordination of capital taxation among symmetric countries

Susana PERALTA and Tanguy van Ypersele ()

No 2002032, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper tackles the issue of international fiscal coordination in a world of integrated markets sovereign national governments. Taxation of mobile capital and immobile labor in order to finance a public good generates inefficient fiscal competition. Two fiscal reforms are considered: a minimum capital tax level and a tax range, i.e., a minimum plus a maximum capital tax level. We show that the introduction of a lower bound to the capital tax level is never preferred to fiscal competition by all countries while there always exists a combination of both a lower and an upper bound which is unanimously accepted.

Keywords: capital mobility; tax competition; tax coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 H21 H23 H3 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries (2003)
Journal Article: Coordination of capital taxation among asymmetric countries (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002032

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