On the selection of one feedback Nash equilibrium in discounted linear-quadratic games

Pierre CARTIGNY and Philippe Michel

No 2002034, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero sum game over an infinite horizon : by introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T > 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game admits a unique solution which converges to a particular Nash feedback equilibrium of the original problem as the horizon T goes to infinity. Key Words. Linear-quadratic games. Nonzero sum differential games. Nash equilibria. Infinite horizon.

Keywords: linear-quadratic games; nonzero sum differential games; Nash equilibria; inÞnite horizon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-01

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002034

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