Supermodularity and complementarity in ecnomics: an elementary survey

Rabah AMIR

No 2003104, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics. This methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions, and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities. The results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner, without reference to lattice theory, for the special case of onedimensional parameter and actions sets, with the emphasis being onwide accessibility. Detailed applications are presented for well-known models of consumer behavior, monopoly pass-through, Bertrand and Cournot competition, strategic R&D, search and matching. Wherever appropriate, useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted.

Keywords: complementarity; supermodularity; comparative statics; ordinal/cardinal; strategic complementarity; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 C60 C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Supermodularity and Complementarity in Economics: An Elementary Survey (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2003104

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