On taxation pass-through for a monopoly firm

Rabah AMIR, Michael TROGE and Isabelle MARET

No 2004039, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper investigates the pass-through of an excise tax imposed on a monopoly firm with constant marginal cost. The optimal price increases as tax increases for any demand function. Tax pass-through is globally under or in excess of 100% according as the direct demand function is log-concave or log-convex. The analysis relies on supermodular optimization and delivers conclusions based on minimal sufficient assumptions in a simple, broadly accessible and self-contained framework. Further results allow for mixed conditions that provide precise and local determination of pass-through. Several illustrative examples are given. Policy conclusions relating to the relative wisdom of taxing high versus low cost monopoly firms are drawn from the results.

Date: 2004-06-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm (2004)
Journal Article: On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2004039

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