Competition over piratable goods

Paul Belleflamme () and Pierre M. Picard ()

No 2004055, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizon tally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the pricing game played by n producers of information goods. We show thereby how the producers' attitudes towards piracy are interdependent and evolve with the relative attractiveness of copies.

Keywords: information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L82 L86 K11 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition over Piratable Goods (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2004055

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