Assessing strategic risk

Robert J. Aumann and Jacques H. DREZE

No 2005020, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversary's choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic foundation for it.

Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2005)
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2004)
Journal Article: Assessing Strategic Risk (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2005020

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