Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms

Olivier Bochet ()

No 2005072, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackson and Palfrey, 2001).

Keywords: lottery mechanism; Maskin monotonicity; no-veto power; Nash implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms (2005)
Journal Article: Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2005072

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