Upstream market foreclosure

Jean Gabszewicz () and Skerdilajda Zanaj ()

No 2006043, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the Þrst one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with the seller of the input.

Keywords: entry deterrence; foreclosure; overinvestment; bilateral monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D43 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp06/dp2006_43.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Upstream market foreclosure (2006)
Journal Article: UPSTREAM MARKET FORECLOSURE (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2006043

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Address: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Alain GILLIS ().