Helmuth Cremer (),
Philippe De Donder,
Darío Maldonado () and
Pierre PESTIEAU Additional contact information Pierre PESTIEAU: UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Abstract:
This paper shows that the combination of habit formation Ð present consumption creating additional consumption needs in the future Ð and myopia may explain why some retirees are forced to "unretire", i.e., unexpectedly return to work. It also shows that when myopia about habit formation leads to unretirement there is a case for government's intervention. In a first-best setting the optimal solution can be decentralized by a simple "Pigouvian" (paternalistic) consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a second-best setting, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consumption taxes may have conflicting paternalistic and redistributive effects. We study the design of consumption taxes in such a setting when myopic individuals differ in productivity.
Keywords:habit formation; myopia; unretiring (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D91H21H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2008-06-01