On Gale and Shapley ÔCollege admissions and stability of marriageÕ

Jean Gabszewicz (), Filomena Garcia (), Joana Vaz Pais () and Joana RESENDE
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Joana RESENDE: UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

No 2008067, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavily destabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by the arrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly how stability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomena affecting the composition of the marriage market.

Keywords: matching; stability; marriage model; divorce cascades. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008-12-01

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Working Paper: On Gale and Shapley ÔCollege admissions and stability of marriageÕ (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008067

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