Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation
Gilles Saint-Paul ()
No 1338, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
This paper develops a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The key idea is that, to avoid paying firing costs, the country with a rigid labour market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at late stages in their product life cycles. With international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low-firing cost country, and then move to the high-firing cost country. The paper shows that in the closed economy, an increase in firing costs does not necessarily imply a reduction in R&D; it crucially depends on the riskiness of R&D activity relative to productive activity. In the open economy, however, an increase in firing costs is much more likely to reduce R&D intensity.
Keywords: Employment Protection; Firing Costs; Innovation; International Specialilzation; International Trade; Product Life Cycle; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F17 J21 J32 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Employment protection, international specialization, and innovation (2002)
Working Paper: Employment protection, international specialization and innovation (1997)
Working Paper: Employment Protection, International Specialization, and innovation (1996)
Working Paper: Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation (1995)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1338
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