Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks, Small Banks, and Secondary Prices

Raquel Fernandez () and Sule Ozler

No 1655, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Commercial bank debts of developing countries are held by a heterogenous group of banks. Here we focus on the distinction between large international money-centre banks and smaller domestic banks. In particular we investigate the role of debt concentration – the amount of a country’s debt held by large banks relative to small banks – on the secondary market price for these loans. Our empirical investigation indicates that concentration is an important determinant of secondary market discounts: higher concentration decreases the discount. An explanation for this finding is provided in the context of a bargaining model that endogenizes the level of the maximum penalty that banks can credibly threaten to impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks’ bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, which in turn increases repayment and secondary market prices (and hence lowers discounts).

Keywords: Bargaining Power; Secondary Market Prices; Sovereign Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-06

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