Market Structure, Trade Liberalization, and the GATS

Joseph Francis Francois () and Ian Wooton ()

No 2669, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this Paper we examine the interaction between the different modes of market access commitments in services (cross-border and establishment) market structure, and regulation. In this context, we focus on the impact of improved domestic market access for a foreign service provider on a domestic service market. We work with a model where the domestic industry is assumed to be imperfectly competitive and, as a result of domestic regulation, is able to act as a cartel. We also examine the incentives for the domestic firms to accommodate the entry of the foreign firm by inviting it to join the cartel.

Keywords: Imperfect Competition; Market Access; Services Trade; Trade Liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 F23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01
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Journal Article: Market structure, trade liberalization and the GATS (2001)
Working Paper: Market Structure, Trade Liberalization and the GATS (2000)
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