Issue Unbundling via Citizens' initiatives

Timothy Besley () and Stephen Coate ()

No 2857, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The role of citizens' intitiatives figures prominantly in contemporary debates on constitutional change. A basic question is why are initiatives necessary in a representative democracy where candidates must already compete for the right to control policy? This Paper offers one answer to this question. In a representative democracy, the bundling of issues, together with the fact that citizens have only one vote, means that policy outcomes on specific issues may diverge far from what the majority of citizens want. In such circumstances, allowing citizens to put legislation directly on the ballot permits the 'unbundling' of these issues, which forces a closer relationship between policy outcomes and popular preferences. To the extent that it is condsidered socially undesirable for outcomes on specific issues to stray too far from what the majority wants, this creates a role for citizens initiatives.

Keywords: citizens' initiatives; direct democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06
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