A Democratic Model of the `Rent-Sought' Benefit Cycle

Michael Beenstock ()

No 289, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Lobby groups press for various administrative concessions which are granted at the expense of the rest of society. This paper tries to explain why sometimes the rest of society does not prevent the lobbies from exploiting them while at other times it protests against the injustice. It also suggests why after a while the public may demand a reform in which the concessions are abolished. The basic analytical insight is that there may be an externality to successful lobbying; when one group succeeds this establishes a precedent that makes it easier for other groups to succeed. The chain reaction that is thus triggered may be to the advantage of a majority of the electorate.

Keywords: Democracy; Externalitics; Lobby Groups; Majority Voting; Political Economy; Public Choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989-04

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP289.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:289

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP289.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().