Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis

James Albrecht () and Jan van Ours ()

No 2968, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Keywords: recruitment; signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using employer hiring behavior to test the educational signaling hypothesis (2001)
Journal Article: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2006)
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