Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability

Timothy Besley () and Andrea Prat

No 3132, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters. Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role. We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them. In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture. We examine evidence both across countries and within India.

JEL-codes: D70 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: Written
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3132.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2005)
Journal Article: Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3132

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3132.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().