An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

Pascal Courty () and Gerald Roger Marschke ()

No 3164, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behaviour diverts resources (eg agents' time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behaviour we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

Keywords: contract theory; government incentives; moral hazard; multi tasking; performance incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01
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Journal Article: An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives (2004)
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