Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: Evidence from Swedish Newspapers

Marcus Asplund, Rickard Eriksson and Niklas Strand

No 3269, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper provides an empirical examination of third-degree price discrimination in the Swedish newspaper industry. The results show that price discrimination is more prevalent in competitive markets and among newspapers with low market shares. This supports predictions from recent theoretical work, including Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), that suggest that firms attempt to poach consumers from rivals by offering targeted discounts. In addition, we find weak evidence that newspapers in markets with large inflows of new consumers and those covering wide geographical areas offer more discounts.

Keywords: newspapers; oligopoly; price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2002-03
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Working Paper: Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: Evidence from Swedish Newspapers (2007)
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