Perfectly Competitive Innovation

Michele Boldrin () and David Levine

No 3274, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We construct a competitive model of innovation and growth under constant returns to scale. Previous models of growth under constant returns cannot model technological innovation. Current models of endogenous innovation rely on the interplay between increasing returns and monopolistic markets. In fact, established wisdom claims monopoly power to be instrumental for innovation and sees the non-rivalrous nature of ideas as a natural conduit to increasing returns. The results here challenge the positive description of previous models and the normative conclusion that monopoly through copyright and patent is socially beneficial.

Keywords: endogenous technological change; innovation; monopoly power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 L16 O11 O31 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
Date: 2002-03
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3274.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2002)
Working Paper: Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2000)
Working Paper: Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2006)
Working Paper: Perfectly competitive innovation (2002)
Journal Article: Perfectly competitive innovation (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3274

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3274.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().