Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access

Joseph Francois () and Will J Martin ()

No 3294, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of ‘market access’, emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.

Keywords: commercial policy uncertainty; expected costs of protection; market access; WTO tariff bindings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F13 F17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access (2002)
Journal Article: Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access (2004)
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