Affirmative Action and Efficiency in Education

Gianni De Fraja ()

No 3357, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper studies the optimal education policy in the presence of different groups of households, with groups differing in the distribution of the ability to benefit from education. The main result is that the high ability individuals from groups with relatively few high ability individuals should receive more education than equally able individuals from groups with a more favourable distribution of abilities. The interpretation of this conclusion is that affirmative action policies can find a rationale on efficiency grounds alone.

Keywords: affirmative action; education policy; minorities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
Date: 2002-05
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