Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair?

Gilles Saint-Paul ()

No 3693, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: If redistribution is distortionary, and if the income of skilled workers is due to knowledge-intensive activities and depends positively on intellectual property, a social planner which cares about income distribution may in principle want to use a reduction in Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) rather than redistributive transfers. On the one hand, such a reduction reduces statis inefficiency. On the other hand, standard redistribution also reduces the level of R&D because it distorts occupational choice. We study this possibility in the context of a model with horizontal innovation, where the government, in addition to taxes and transfers, controls the fraction of innovations that are granted patents. The model predicts that standard redistribution always dominates limitations to IPRs.

Keywords: human capital; income distribution; inequality; innovation; intellectual property rights; redistribution; welfare state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 H23 I30 J24 J31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair? (2002)
Working Paper: Are Intellectual Property Rights Unfair? (2002)
Journal Article: Are intellectual property rights unfair? (2004)
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