An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy

Luis M B Cabral ()

No 3878, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: I treat international merger policy as a repeated veto game. I derive optimal equilibria and consider a series of comparative statistics and extensions.

Keywords: merger policy; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F00 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy (2003)
Journal Article: An equilibrium approach to international merger policy (2005)
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