Monopoly Practises and Competitive Behaviour in the French Satellite Pay-TV Market

Michele Cincera () and Abdul G. Noury ()

No 4174, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This Paper uses monthly data from a differentiated market dominated by a duopoly to analyse the nature of interactions between competitor firms. The incumbent, Canal Satellite, and the entrant, TPS, have dominated the French satellite pay-TV market, characterized by a monopoly until the end of 1997. This Paper investigates the effects of the entry and tests for collusive behaviour by means of non-nested methods in this duopoly with differentiated products. The main findings reject collusive behaviours in favour of Stackelberg competition with the incumbent as the leader. A preliminary comparison with the UK Satellite pay-TV market characterized by a monopoly indicates that prices are substantially lower in France. In view of our results, we argue that the difference can be explained by more competition between firms in the French case.

Keywords: competition; media; pay-tv; structural models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-ind
Date: 2004-01
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4174.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Monopoly practises and competitive behaviour in the French satellite pay-TV market (2004)
Working Paper: Monopoly practises and competitive behaviour in the French satellite Pay-TV market (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4174

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4174.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().