Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad ()

No 4245, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.

Keywords: easy targets; timing of conflict; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 D74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Date: 2004-02
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Working Paper: Easy targets and the timing of conflict (2003)
Working Paper: Easy targets and the timing of conflict (2003)
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