Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

Lars Frisell and Johan N. M. Lagerlöf ()

No 4313, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policy-maker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare, and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which, as an unintended side effect, lower the lobbyist’s incentives for truth telling.

Keywords: bias; inequality; information transmission; interest groups; lobbying; representation; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
Working Paper: Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal Representation (2004)
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