Who's Who in Crime Networks: Wanted - The Key Player

Coralio Ballester (), Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou ()

No 4421, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modelled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a bounty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort they will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to their equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyse a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player’s centrality and their contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals.

Keywords: centrality measures; crime; key group; policies; social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
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