The Political Economy of Urban Transport System Choice

Jan K. Brueckner () and Harris Selod ()

No 4682, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyzes the political economy of transport-system choice, with the goal of gaining an understanding of the forces involved in this important urban public policy decision. Transport systems pose a continuous trade-off between time and money cost, so that a city can choose a fast system with a high money cost per mile or a slower, cheaper system. The paper compares the socially optimal transport system to the one chosen under the voting process, focusing on both homogeneous and heterogeneous cities, while considering different landownership arrangements. The analysis identifies a bias toward underinvestment in transport quality in heterogeneous cities.

Keywords: income heterogeneity; multiple transport systems; over-investment in transport quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: Written

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of urban transport-system choice (2006)
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