Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime

Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Thierry A. Verdier () and Yves Zenou ()

No 5448, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyses the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labour. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighbourhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions.

Keywords: crime; forward-looking agents; labour market; social interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 J40 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-law, nep-reg, nep-soc and nep-ure
Date: 2006-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5448.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Strong and weak ties in employment and crime (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5448

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5448.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().