Abstract:
We describe new ideas as incomplete concepts for which the innovator needs feedback from agents with complementary skills. Once shared, ideas may be stolen. We compare how different contractual environments support invention and implementation. Markets, as open exchange systems, are good for circulation and thus elaboration, but may fail to reward idea generation. Firms, as controlled idea exchange systems, can reward idea generation but can do so only by restricting their circulation. This identifies a basic trade-off between protecting the rights of invention and the best implementation of ideas. An environment that allows ideas to cross firm boundaries enhances the rate of innovation and creates a symbiotic relationship between markets and firms.
Downloads: (external link) http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5469.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works: This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Series data maintained by ().
This site is part of RePEc
and all the data displayed here is part of the RePEc data set.
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to
contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .