Product Market Reforms, Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment

Rachel Griffith (), Rupert Harrison and Gareth Macartney

No 5599, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages, and how this depends on labour market institutions. We use differential changes in regulations across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the effects of competition. We find that increased product market competition reduces unemployment, and that it does so more in countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power. The theoretical intuition is that both firms with market power and unions with bargaining power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market. We also find that the effect of increased competition on real wages is beneficial to workers, but less so when they have high bargaining power. Intuitively, real wages increase through a drop in the general price level, but workers with bargaining power lose out somewhat from a reduction in the rents that they had previously captured.

Keywords: competition; product market regulation; unemployment; wage bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J50 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-reg
Date: 2006-04
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5599.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Product market reforms, labour market institutions and unemployment (2006)
Journal Article: Product Market Reforms, Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5599

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5599.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().