Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change

Torsten Persson () and Guido Tabellini ()

No 5654, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change. Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic capital - measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood - reduces the exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a sucessful coup. Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development jointly with the consolidation of democracy.

Keywords: economic growth; hazard rates; political regimes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H11 N10 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2006-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change (2006)
Working Paper: Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change (2006)
Working Paper: Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change (2006)
Journal Article: Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change (2009)
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