The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital or Constituencies

Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales

No 5867, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Why is underdevelopment so persistent? One explanation is that poor countries do not have institutions that can support growth. Because institutions (both good and bad) are persistent, underdevelopment is persistent. An alternative view is that underdevelopment comes from poor education. Neither explanation is fully satisfactory, the first because it does not explain why poor economic institutions persist even in fairly democratic but poor societies, and the second because it does not explain why poor education is so persistent. This paper tries to reconcile these two views by arguing that the underlying cause of underdevelopment is the initial distribution of factor endowments. Under certain circumstances, this leads to self-interested constituencies that, in equilibrium, perpetuate the status quo. In other words, poor education policy might well be the proximate cause of underdevelopment, but the deeper (and more long lasting cause) are the initial conditions (like the initial distribution of education) that determine political constituencies, their power, and their incentives. Though the initial conditions may well be a legacy of the colonial past, and may well create a perverse political equilibrium of stagnation, persistence does not require the presence of coercive political institutions. We present some suggestive empirical evidence. On the one hand, such an analysis offers hope that the destiny of societies is not preordained by the institutions they inherited through historical accident. On the other hand, it suggests we need to understand better how to alter factor endowments when societies may not have the internal will to do so.

Keywords: human capital; institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-edu, nep-ltv, nep-pke and nep-soc
Date: 2006-10
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Working Paper: The Persistence of Underdevelopment:Institutions, Human Capital or Constituencies? (2006)
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