Abstract:
In this paper we investigate the positive and normative consequences of child-labour restrictions for economic aggregates and welfare. We argue that even though the laissez-faire equilibrium may be inefficient, there are usually better policies to cure these inefficiencies than the imposition of a child-labour ban. Given this finding, we investigate the potential political-economic reasons behind the emergence and persistence of child-labour legislation. Our investigation is based on a structural dynamic general equilibrium model that provides a coherent and uniform framework for our analysis.
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