International Taxation and the Direction and Volume of Cross-Border M&As

Harry P. Huizinga and Johannes Voget

No 5974, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In an international merger or acquisition, the national residences of the acquirer and the target determine to what extent the newly created multinational firm is subject to international double taxation. This paper presents evidence that the parent-subsidiary structure of newly created multinational firms reflects the prospect of international double taxation. The number of acquiring firms at the national level similarly reflects international double taxation. The evidence suggests that tax policy in the form of lower tax rates or the elimination of residence-based worldwide taxation attracts additional parent companies of multinational firms. On the basis of our estimation, we simulate the impact of the elimination of worldwide taxation by the United States on parent firm selection.

Keywords: international taxation; mergers and acquisitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-int and nep-pbe
Date: Written
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Journal Article: International Taxation and the Direction and Volume of Cross-Border M&As (2009)
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