Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration

Rocco Macchiavello ()

No 6104, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Does vertical integration reduce or increase transaction costs with external investors? This paper analyzes an incomplete contracts model of vertical integration in which a seller and a buyer with no cash need to finance investments for production. The firm is modeled as a "nexus of contracts" across the intermediate input supply and the financing transaction. The costs and benefits of vertical integration depend on the relative importance of a positive "contractual centralization" effect against a negative "de-monitoring" effect: the firm centrally organizes the nexus of contracts reducing the extent of contractual externalities while the market disciplines decisions driven by private benefits. Larger projects, more specific assets, and low investors protection are determinants of vertical integration.

Keywords: contractual externalities; investors protection; limited liability; theory of the firm; vertical integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G32 K12 L22 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-com and nep-law
Date: 2007-02
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