Privatisation in Poland: What Was the Government Trying to Achieve?

Gianni De Fraja () and Barbara M Roberts

No 6114, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper uses the sequencing of privatisation to infer the objective pursued by the Polish government in the privatisation of its large manufacturing firms in the second half of the 1990's. We construct a model of mixed oligopoly, and use it to evaluate the privatisation process; our analysis is based on the assumption that firms which furthered the government's objective function the most would be chosen to be privatised first. Our empirical analysis identifies the features of the firms that were chosen for early privatisation, and suggests that the welfare maximisation was more important than the desire to maximise the revenues from privatisation and the government's budget, or to minimise employment losses.

Keywords: Eastern Europe; mixed oligopoly; Poland; privatisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-tra
Date: 2007-02
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