Women's Earning Power and the 'Double Burden' of Market and Household Work

Natalie A. Chen (), Paola Conconi () and Carlo Perroni

No 6269, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Bargaining theory suggests that married women who experience a relative improvement in their labour market position should experience a comparative gain within their marriage. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labour market allows comparatively more flexibility in their labour supply responses. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for women exacerbate their 'double burden' of market and household work.

Keywords: Bargaining; Marriage; Renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 J2 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Date: 2007-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: Women's Earning Power and the "Double Burden" of Market and Household Work (2007)
Working Paper: Women’s Earning Power and the “Double Burden” of Market and Household Work (2007)
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